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The Kenya Vision 2030 envisions a globally competitive financial sector and proposes transforming 
the banking sector to have fewer, stronger and larger scale banks. In this regard, the National Treasury 
proposed and implemented an increase in the minimum core capital requirement in 2008 and proposed 
a further increase in 2015 and 2016 to improve competition in the banking sector, increase the level 
of savings in the economy and strengthen banks. This study sought to find out the effect of the 2008 
increase in the minimum core capital requirement from Kshs.250 million to Kshs.1 billion on bank 
performance in the Kenyan banking sector. The specific variables that were studied to evaluate their 
impact on bank performance following an increase in core capital were competition and profitability. 
The study focused on the Kenyan banking sector from 2003 to 2016 and adopted an exploratory study 
approach. The research relied on secondary data from CBK and therefore took a quantitative approach. 
The entire population of 39 banks as provided by the CBK as at 31st December 2016 was studied. The 
study was conducted according to the three peer group classification provided by CBK as presented 
in Appendix B. The paired t-test was used to evaluate whether there was a change in competition and 
profitability pre and post increase in the minimum core capital requirement. Regression models were 
further included to assess the strength of the relationship between the dependent variables competition 
and profitability and the independent variable core capital and control variables total deposits, profits 
before tax, inflation and GDP. Results indicate that the regulatory increase in the core capital 
requirement had an inconsistent effect on profitability and competition in the three banking peer 
groups. In particular, as indicated by the paired t-test, there was no statistically inferred difference for 
both competition and profitability in all the three peer groups except for competition in peer group 
one. The policy recommendation arising from this study is for the regulator to have similar policies 
for the entire industry as well as different policies tailored for each peer group to increase the 
attainment of desired outcome of regulation.   
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction  
This paper is about the effects of the 2008 regulatory increase in the minimum core capital requirement 
on performance of the Kenyan banking sector. It is organized as follows: chapter one gives an 
introduction of the study, including the background, problem statement, research objectives, research 
questions, scope and significance; chapter two provides a critical review of literature; chapter three 
presents the research methodology used in carrying out this study; chapter four presents the research 
findings; chapter five discusses the research findings, conclusion and areas of further study. 
 
1.2 Background of the Study 
Performance of the Kenyan Banking sector has been a topical subject amongst the regulator and law 
makers. Few large banks dominate the market by controlling industry net assets and profits (Kamau 
& Were, 2013). Market dominance is an indicator of low competition in the banking sector (Kamau 
& Were, 2013 and Sanya & Gaertner, 2012). The high cost of credit characterized by wide interest 
rate spreads has led to interest driven exceptional bank profitability (Republic of Kenya, 2013). Kamau 
& Were (2013) found that superior performance in the Kenyan banking sector was held by few large 
banks. The authors further posit that the superior performance was mainly caused by structure and 
collusive power and not efficiency that is, high concentration and relative market powers led to high 
profitability. 
 
The Kenya Vision 2030 (2007) envisages a vibrant and globally competitive financial sector in Kenya 
that will create jobs and promote high level of savings to finance Kenya’s overall investment needs. 
The Vision notes that one of the most urgent steps to achieve a globally competitive financial 
environment in Kenya is to introduce legal and institutional reforms that will enhance transparency in 
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all transactions, build trust and make enforcement of justice more efficient. It also notes that 
transformation of the banking sector to have fewer, stronger and larger scale banks is a step required 
to make the financial sector globally competitive.  
 
In 2008, the Kenya National Treasury proposed an increase in the minimum core capital requirement 
for banks from Kshs.250 million to Kshs.1 billion. The National Treasury (2008) noted that to achieve 
a vibrant and globally competitive financial sector, driving high level of savings and financing Kenya’s 
investment needs as envisioned in the Kenya Vision 2030, several reforms were necessary in the 
banking sector including transforming the large number of small banks into fewer, larger and stronger 
banks. The National Treasury’s proposal was enacted to law. In 2015 and 2016, the National Treasury 
proposed a further increase in core capital from Kshs.1 billion to Kshs.5 billion to make the banking 
system more competitive locally and regionally (National Treasury, 2015). The National Treasury 
backed their proposal with the need for Kenya to have strong well capitalized banks which can finance 
the large projects and withstand financial shocks and crises as envisaged in the Kenya Vision 2030. 
The proposal was shot down by the Kenya National Assembly and was not passed into law because 
the banking sector was already concentrated and increasing the capital requirement further would only 
create more concentration and encourage financial exclusion. 
 
1.3 Overview of the Kenyan Banking Sector 
The Kenyan banking sector comprises of the Central Bank of Kenya (CBK), as the regulator; 42 
commercial banks; one mortgage finance company; eight representative offices of foreign banks; 13 
microfinance banks; three credit reference bureaus; 17 money remittance providers; and 77 foreign 
exchange bureaus (CBK, 2016). Commercial banks are licensed and regulated in accordance with the 
provisions of the Banking Act and the Regulations and Prudential Guidelines issued thereunder. The 
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list of the 42 licensed commercial banks in Kenya are provided in Appendix A. The CBK supervises 
the commercial banks to ensure compliance with the stipulated regulations including capital adequacy 
requirements.  
 
The Banking Act Chapter 488 (Republic of Kenya, 2015) stipulates that commercial banks should 
maintain: (a) a core capital of not less than eight per cent of total risk adjusted assets plus risk adjusted 
off balance sheet items as may be determined by the CBK; (b) core capital of not less than eight per 
cent of its total deposit liabilities; (c) total capital of not less than twelve per cent of its total risk 
adjusted assets plus risk adjusted off balance sheet items as may be determined by Central Bank; and 
(d) a core capital of at least one billion Kenya shillings.  
 
The CBK classifies commercial banks into peer groups of large, medium and small banks based on a 
weighted composite market share index that comprises of net assets, customer deposits, capital and 
reserves, number of deposit accounts and number of loan accounts. This weighted composite index is 
also used to compute the weighted market share. The 2016 market shares held by the three peer groups 
are presented in the table below: 













(Kshs. M) (Kshs. M) (Kshs. M) 
Large 65.32% 8 2,404,194 1,739,278 373,516 
Medium 25.90% 11 981,099 654,602 159,814 
Small 8.77% 20 310,651 211,273 59,094 
Total* 100.00% 39 3,695,944 2,485,919 540,578 
* Charterhouse Bank under Statutory Management, Fidelity Commercial Bank, undergoing 
acquisition and Imperial Bank & Chase Bank under Receivership have been excluded 
Central Bank of Kenya (2016) 
4 
 
According to the above 2016 market share figures, the eight banks in the large peer group controlled 
65.3% of the industry market share in 2016 with the remaining 31 banks controlling 34.7% of the 
market share. A review of the distribution of net assets and shareholder funds of all the commercial 
banks in 2003 and 2016 reveals that large banks dominated the market shares in both years. This 
information is presented in Appendix A.  
 
1.4 Policy, Legal and Institutional Reforms in the Kenyan Banking Sector 
High interest rate spreads, high lending rates and persistent exceptional bank profits have necessitated 
institutional, legal and policy reforms targeted at the competitive landscape of the Kenyan banking 
sector. Reforms targeting reduction of interest rate spreads and exceptional profitability were first 
discussed in 2007 and are outlined in the Kenya Vision 2030 (Republic of Kenya, 2007). The level of 
competition in a bank is, to a large extent, affected by the number of players in control of the market 
share and therefore, achieving a fair balance within a banking industry would involve implementation 
of well-crafted regulations (Rimaviciute & Vilys, 2014). The reform objectives in Kenya have been 
three-fold: increased outreach, improved efficiency and stability of the banking sector (Republic of 
Kenya, 2007). The Kenya Vision 2030 acknowledges that Kenya’s banking sector is highly segmented 
and dominated by few large banks resulting in reduced competition and high credit costs (Republic of 
Kenya, 2007). The Kenya Vision 2030 envisages a vibrant and globally competitive financial sector 
in Kenya that will create jobs and promote high level of savings to finance Kenya’s overall investment 
needs. The Kenya Vision 2030 notes that transformation of the banking sector to have fewer, stronger 
and larger scale banks is a step required to make the financial sector globally competitive.  
 
To operationalize the transformation of the banking sector, the Government of Kenya through the 
Kenya National Treasury proposed an increase in the minimum core capital requirement in 2008 for 
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banks from Kshs.250 million to Kshs.1 billion to be achieved in a graduated scale of Kshs.350 million, 
Kshs.500 million, Kshs.700 million and Kshs.1 billion by the years 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012 
respectively (National Treasury, 2008). The Banking Act Chapter 488 (2015) defines core capital as 
“permanent shareholders' equity in the form of issued and fully paid-up shares of common stock, or 
in the case of foreign incorporated banks, of the assigned capital, plus all disclosed reserves, less 
goodwill or any other intangible assets.” The National Treasury’s proposal was enacted to law and the 
Banking Act (Cap 488) laws of Kenya was amended in 2008. In 2015 and subsequently 2016, the 
National Treasury proposed a further increase in core capital from Kshs.1 billion to Kshs.5 billion to 
make the banking system more competitive locally and regionally (National Treasury, 2015). The 
National Treasury backed their proposal with the need for Kenya to have strong well capitalized banks 
which can finance the large projects and withstand financial shocks and crises as envisaged in the 
Kenya Vision 2030. Both proposals were shot down by the Kenya National Assembly and were not 
passed into law citing that the banking sector was already concentrated and increasing the capital 
requirement further would only create more concentration and encourage financial exclusion. The 
Kenya National Assembly members argued that increasing the minimum core capital requirement 
would stifle the banking sector’s growth and lock out smaller players who were unable to raise the 
additional capital. The members noted that, the smaller banking players had been instrumental in 
increasing financial inclusion in the country. Sanya & Gaertner (2012) noted that lack of competition 
in the banking system was one of the causes of high level of financial exclusion. However, the Kenya 
Vision 2030 (Republic of Kenya, 2007) and Cytonn Investments (2015) viewed Kenya as being 





1.5 Statement of Problem  
Kamau & Were (2013) posit that the Kenyan banking sector has remained largely profitable despite 
the economy performing poorly in some years due to adverse effects of the post-election violence, 
global financial crisis and terrorism attacks in Kenya. As further postulated by the authors, superior 
performance has been held by a few large banks with the main source of this performance being 
structure and collusive power and not efficiency that is, high concentration and relative market powers 
have led to high profitability. Additionally, the high cost of credit characterised by wide interest rate 
spreads led to exceptional bank profits (Republic of Kenya, 2013). Were & Wambua (2013) found 
that interest rate spreads were higher for large banks in Kenya. Sanya & Gaertner (2012) also noted 
that Return on Assets (ROA) for East African banks was about three times higher than for South 
African banks while interest rates spreads were six to eight percent higher which suggested that the 
level of competition in the East Africa Community was much lower than in South Africa. The authors 
further highlight that a decline in lending spreads would provide some indication that competition was 
intensifying within the region. 
 
Wambua & Were (2013) proposed that policies be put in place to enhance competition and promote 
the growth and image of small and medium sized banks in a bid to enhance their ability to penetrate 
the market to break market dominance by a few banks. The National Treasury had envisioned that the 
2008 increase in minimum core capital requirement would motivate small banks to merge or seek 
other forms of consolidation. It was envisaged that the resulting banks from the mergers would be 
efficient due to economies of scale and enhanced capacity thereby be able to compete with large banks. 
The consolidation activities undertaken between 2008 and 2010 reduced the number of commercial 
banks from 45 in 2008 to 43 in 2012 (CBK, 2012). Between 2012 and 2016, there were not any mergers 
and acquisitions in the banking sector (CBK, 2016). Additionally, only eight out of 39 banks were 
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classified as large banks in 2016 using CBK’s weighted composite index and controlled a market share 
of 65.3%. This means that the banking sector is still dominated by few large banks which hold majority 
of the assets and have exceptional profits hence the 2008 increase in core capital did not achieve the 
intended purpose. 
 
The level of minimum core capital requirement is a topical issue having been periodically discussed 
in Parliament hence it is useful to study the effect of this policy on various aspects of the banking 
sector. This study sought to establish the extent that the 2008 increase in the minimum core capital 
requirement affected performance by specifically looking at competition and profitability in the 
Kenyan banking sector. 
 
1.6 Research Objectives 
i. General Research Objective 
The overall research objective of this study was to investigate the effect of increasing the minimum 
core capital requirement in 2008 on the Kenyan banking industry performance by comparing the pre-
regulatory increase period of 2003 to 2008 to the post-regulatory increase period of 2009 to 2016. 
 
ii. Specific Research Objectives 
The specific research objectives for this study were to: 
1. Analyze the effect of increasing core capital on competition in the Kenyan banking sector.  
2. Investigate the effect of increasing core capital on profitability in the Kenyan banking sector.  
 
1.7 Research Questions 
The research questions that were addressed in this study are: 
8 
 
1. What has been the effect of increasing core capital on competition in the Kenyan banking sector? 
2. What has been the effect of increasing core capital on profitability in the Kenyan banking sector? 
 
1.8 Scope  
The study focused on the relationship between core capital and performance, specifically profitability 
and competition, with a view to draw conclusions as to what extent core capital accounts for 
performance of banks in Kenya. The study covered the performace of the Kenyan banking industry 
from 2003 to 2016 specifically, the period between 2003 and 2008 which represents the period pre-




This study is significant on several fronts to law makers, regulators, academia and banks. Firstly, the 
study aimed to contribute to the existing literature on the low level of competition and dominance of 
profits by few large banks in the Kenyan banking sector. Secondly, the study aimed to contribute to 
the ongoing debate on exceptional profitability of banks in Kenya by examining the impact of 
regulation of core capital on bank performance. 
 
Thirdly, by establishing the relationship between bank core capital and bank performance, the study 
aimed to unravel how bank competition and profitability responds to regulatory changes in the Kenyan 
banking sector. This would be valuable in making insightful policy recommendations for consideration 
by the regulator, CBK. Finally, the study aimed to assist banks to understand the impact of the level 
of core capital on their performance by establishing the relationship between bank core capital and 
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bank profitability. Establishing this relationship would assist the banks to determine the extent to 
which other strategies should be employed to boost their competitive advantage and profitability.   
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the theoretical and empirical literature review regarding the relationship between 
bank core capital and competition as well as the relationship between bank core capital and 
profitability. Section 2.2 discusses the theories behind the relationships; section 2.3 discusses the 
application of the theories in studies and the various variables considered in assessing competition and 
profitability in the industry; section 2.4 presents the research gap arising from the literature review; 
and section 2.5 concludes the chapter by presenting the conceptual framework. 
 
2.2 Theoretical Framework 
Several theories have been advanced to explain a firm’s capital structure and market performance in 
terms of competition and profitability. These theories are presented below. 
 
2.2.1.  The Modigliani-Miller Theorem 
According to this theorem put forward by Modigliani and Miller (1958), in an unregulated 
environment without the costs associated with taxation and bankruptcy charges, the mode through 
which a bank is financed is inconsequential to its market value; this is because the market value of a 
bank is determined by its earning power and the risks associated with its assets. However, given that 
banks operate in an environment with taxation and other associated charges, it is necessary for the 
optimization of lending avenues for minimal expenditure. In light of this observation, banks with 
optimal debt financing are able to claim tax cuts on account of this mode of financing and are therefore 
able to perform better than those financed solely or over-proportionally by non-liability sources, such 
as shareholder funding. In relating this theorem to capital adequacy regulation, it is apparent to the 
regulators interest that the amount of capital assembled through equity capital and declared reserves 
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be regulated to curtail overreliance on risk taking through increased loan-based funding with the 
incentive of reduced taxation in markets that provide tax cuts through considering banks' capital 
structure. The Modigliani-Miller theorem is therefore important in optimization of a company's 
financing considering capital requirements by law. 
 
2.2.2. Neo Classical Theory of Markets 
The Neo-classical theory can be attributed to the contributions of Waras (1889), Marshal (1890), 
Pareto (1906) & Hicks (1979), as noted by Mitra-Kahn (2005). The theory argues that depending on 
a firm’s or buyer’s ability to influence price, markets can either be competitive, oligopolistic, 
monopolistic competition, monopsony or monopoly. The two extreme cases in the continuum are 
perfect competition and monopoly. Under perfect competition neither the buyer nor seller have the 
ability to influence the price given the quantity while under monopoly, the seller has absolute power 
to set the price given the quantity (Mitra-Kahn, 2005). Competition is therefore a measure of the firm’s 
ability to influence price (Keat, Young, & Erfle, 2014). Under perfect competition, the power to 
influence price is zero and is maximum under monopoly. Competition and the power to influence price 
are therefore inversely related. As such, competition is highest when the market structure is perfectly 
competitive and least under monopoly. This study is relevant since it studies profitability and 
competition in a market set up. Specifically, it provides for the measurement of competition through 
estimation of determinants of profitability through the performance dynamic approach and non 
performance dynamic approach. Its shortcoming is that it looks at the two variables from a market 




2.2.3. Structure Conduct Performance Paradigm 
The Structure Conduct Performance (SCP) Paradigm is credited to Bain 1958 and it postulates that 
markets which are highly concentrated are less competitive than markets which are lowly concentrated 
(Kamau & Were, 2013). The SCP model is a traditional industrial organization approach which argues 
that greater concentration causes less competitive bank conduct and leads to higher prices and higher 
profitability (Kamau & Were, 2013; Fungacova, Solanko & Weill, 2010). This implies that 
concentration has a positive relationship with profitability. Therefore, markets which are dominated 
by few large firms operate in highly concentrated markets and tend to exhibit anti-competitive 
behaviour resulting in poor market performance (Kamau & Were, 2013). The SCP paradigm therefore 
encourages limiting the number of competitors in the market to result in collusion and higher profits 
for the banks. Kamau & Were (2013) note that the number of competitors can be limited by 
encouraging mergers to achieve a larger market share and hence profitability. Goddard, Liu, Molyneux 
& Wilson (2010) note that according to the SCP paradigm, a small number of banks may be able to 
collude either implicitly or explicitly, or exploit their market power independently, to charge higher 
prices, pay lower rates on deposits hence earn excess profits.  
 
2.3 Empirical Framework 
2.3.1. Core Capital and Competition 
Competition, in the banking industry, involves a banks ability to participate profitably and sustainably 
within the industry (Robinson, 2001). Keat et al (2014) define market power as the power of a firm to 
establish the price of its products. In a perfect competition, where there are many sellers offering the 
same product, a particular firm has virtually no control over the price of its products. In contrast, a 
monopoly has considerable market power given that it is the only seller in the market and can establish 
its price at whatever level it wants. Monopolistic competition and oligopoly are in between the two 
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extremes of perfect competition in terms of their market power Keat et al (2014). Sanya & Gaertner 
(2012) stated that “concentration ratios are perhaps the most frequently used indicator of banking 
sector competitiveness, with a high share of assets controlled by a small number of banks typically 
interpreted as indicative of a low level of competition”. The authors further infer that it follows that 
presence of highly profitable banks, a large share of industry assets being controlled by a small number 
of banks and higher interest rate spreads reflect lack of competition in the banking sector. The 
Herfindahl Hirschman Index (HHI) will be used to determine the market power with the market share 
of each bank determined by its net assets relative to the industry’s total net assets. Akomea & Adusei 





where Sn represents the market share of firm i and there are n firms in the market. 
 
In a comparative study of the American and Canadian banking industries, Joanna Baron, Janda, Velk, 
& Lemieux (2013) posit that it is not the number of regulations at play that is important but rather the 
quality of the regulations vis-à-vis their intended outcome. The authors pointed to the difference in the 
banking industries of the two countries and highighted that despite Canada having comparatively 
fewer regulations, those in effect had a more significant effect in achieving stability than had been the 
case in the United States. Furthermore, Joanna et al (2013) emphasized that the financial institutions 
responsible for the precipitous economic crisis of 2008 were among the most regulated, albeit, with 
misguided or ill-fitting regulations as assessed according to their intended aim and as a result, 





In assessing the anticipated effects of China's entry into the World Trade Organization, Wong and 
Wong (2001) highlighted that the role of regulation in achieving equitable competition in an industry 
could be viewed in isolation. Particularly focusing on the situation in China, the authors highlighted 
that although entry into the World Trade Organization would, on paper, bolster competition, entrants 
to the market would be forced to contend with factors such as institutional inter-arrangements, interest 
rate and credit controls, directed lending, artificial business restrictions and state guarantees, 
particularly among government owned banks. Relating findings from this study and those posited by 
Rimaviciute & Vilys (2014) who brought to light the effects of collusions among banks in Lithuania 
where three banks commanded 68% total assets, loans and deposits, it is necessary to assess the role 
that multiple metrics have in determining the level of competition within the banking industry. This 
study therefore included total assets (included by market share), loans (included as total and gross non-
performing loans) and total deposits in assessing the effects of regulation on competition within the 
Kenyan Banking industry. 
 
Tan & Floros (2014) studied the Chinese banking industry and found a negative relationship to exist 
between bank profitability and competition positing that banks with high profitability generally tend 
to operate in less competitive environments. The authors focused on a variety of metrics as indicators 
of profitability and employed a Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) model in analyzing data. 
Results from their study pointed to an inverse relationship between profitability metrics, among which 
ROE volatility was included, and competition. The findings of this study was that factors that 
positively correlate with ROE as a profitability metric also correlate negatively with indicators of 




Sanya & Gaertner (2012) studied the banking sector competition in Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda and 
Rwanda in a bid to estimate the degree of competition. They analysed bank level consolidated financial 
data from 2001 to 2008 using the Lerner index and the Panzar Rosse H-statistic to gauge market 
contestability. Their results showed that the East African banking systems had monopolistic 
competition with the degree of competition strongly linked to the level of economic development, 
contestability of markets and quality of institutions. They characterised the banking competition as 
monopolistic due to absence of barriers to entry but found structural impediments which enabled some 
banks to enjoy a degree of monopoly power. Empirical results from their panel data regressions 
indicated that greater market concentration reduced competition. They also found that the East African 
banking sector was less competitive than other countries that had a higher level of financial and 
economic development. They concluded that greater market concentration reduced competition and 
that  the degree of competition was low due to a combination of structural and socio-economic factors.   
 
Nekatibeb (2012) analysed the Ethiopian banking sector for evidence of market power using the Lerner 
Index with annual data from 2002 to 2011. Using a model of oligopolistic conduct, he found that 
Ethiopian banks exercised market power in setting prices. He found market power to be positively 
influenced by bank specific factors namely: operating efficiency and size. Inflation, elasticity of 
demand to loans and excessive size had a weakening effect on exercise of bank’s market power. 
Furthermore, concentration, risk, reserve and proportion of non-interest income had an insignificant 
effect on market power. Greater market power of financial intermediaries and higher  costs of financial 
intermediation lowered economic growth. Nekatibeb (2012) observed that Ethiopia’s central bank did 
not implement available policy instruments to minimize the impact of market power on social welfare 
and economic growth. The author therefore concluded that the level of competition in the Ethiopian 
banking system was low and recommended that the regulatory authorities should design measures 
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aimed at creating further incentives for enhancing competitiveness in the banking sector for instance 
by creating an enabling environment for contestability in the banking industry. The author expected 
such measures to strengthen the degree of competition and in effect diminish the banks’ exercise of 
market power and propagate efficiency gains across the banking market. However, he recommended 
against adjusting economic policy instruments which were expected to enhance the market power of 
commercial banks for example, abating inflation was expected to result in macroeconomic stability 
but also resulted in increased market power of banks which suggested that economic stability and bank 
market power have a positive relationship. 
 
Simpasa (2010) evaluated the intensity of competition in the Zambian banking sector using a bank 
specific and time varying Lerner Index. He found that Zambian banks exercised market power in 
setting prices. The market power was mainly driven by market concentration, efficiency performance, 
diversity in revenue sources and regulatory intensity. Additionally, he also established that bank 
specific, structural and macroeconomic factors were important in explaining banks’ exercise of market 
power. The level of concentration was found to reinforce banks’ exercise of market power, indicating 
that market dominance was influential in the banks’ pricing behaviour. On the contrary, credit risk and 
macroeconomic uncertainty had a weakening effect on the banks’ exercise of market power. Simpasa 
(2010) concluded that there was a low level of competition in the Zambian banking system and 
recommended that the authorities should design measures aimed at creating further incentives for 
enhancing competitiveness in the sector. Particularly, he suggested that the authorities should create 
an enabling environment for contestability.  
 
Fungacova et al (2010) analysed competition in the Russian banking sector by measuring the market 
power of banks between 2001 and 2006 using the Lerner index. They found that the Russian banking 
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industry did not suffer from excessive market power of banks and that the level of bank competition 
was similar to that observed in developed countries. They also found that concentration and risk 
influenced market power, ownership had no influence on market power while size had a nonlinear 
influence. Additionally, Fungacova et al (2010) found that bank competition was important for 
economic growth in emerging countries including Russia. These countries were characterized by low 
ratios of credit to GDP which could have resulted from financing obstacles that were created by 
subdued banking competition. Additionally, bank lending was the leading source of external finance 
in the emerging countries, owing notably to underdeveloped capital markets. However, they were not 
certain that designing a procompetitive policy in Russia was advisable given that bank size and market 
power had an inverse U-curve relationship; the banking sector did not suffer from a particularly weak 
level of competition; and that the country was going through a period of financial instability 
Fungacova et al (2010). 
 
Tabak, Gomes & Junior (2012) examined the competitive behaviour of the Brazilian banking industry 
to investigate whether banks’ risk-taking behaviour was affected by their market power. In their 
analysis, they used the Panzar and Rosse model and the local regression technique and relied on the 
market power at the bank level and H-statistic of the Brazilian economy as their variables. They found 
that market power was positively related to risk taking behaviour, specifically, banks with increasing 
market power engaged in riskier behaviour than banks with decreasing market power. Additionally, 
they also found that the capitalization of banks had an important influence on their market power. 
Particularly, an increase in capital caused banks with higher market power to behave more 
conservatively. This is because increased capitalization reduced the risk taken by banks. Based on 
their findings, Tabak et al (2012) observed that banks with greater market power increased their risk 
to increase collected rents. However, where banks with increased market power become more 
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capitalized, the bank become more conservative and reduced its risk. The converse was held whereby 
banks with decreased market power and decreased capitalization assumed more risk. They concluded 
that banks with higher market power assumed more risk to obtain increased rents. Tabak et al (2012) 
explained that an increase in bank capital led to the growth of the banks charter value and the 
possibility that the risky behaviour will result in increased losses to the charter value. They concluded 
that banks with monopoly rents were not conservative in the Brazilian banking industry until they 
achieved sufficiently high charter values, at which point the potential losses from risky actions became 
too exorbitant to justify the assumption of greater risks. They also suggested that the Brazilian banking 
industry included significant heterogeneities in the market power of banks and was characterized by 
monopolistic competition implying that the banking industry featured several banks with high market 
power and a large majority of banks with relatively little market power.  
 
2.3.2. Core Capital and Profitability 
Profitability in commercial banks is determined by the ability of the banks to retain capital, absorb 
loan losses, support future growth of assets and provide return to investors (Qin & Pastory, 2012). 
Gudmundsson et al (2013) and Goddard et al (2014) postulate that Return on Equity (ROE) is often 
the best measure of earnings and profitability of commercial banks. Nguyen et al (2018) suggest that 
ROE is one of the most comprehensive measures of profitability for commercial banks since it factors 
in off balance sheet activities and also considers a bank’s ultimate goal which is to maximise 
shareholders’ value. Berger & Bouwman (2013) define ROE as net income divided by shareholders 
equity. They argue that ROE is a comprehensive measure of profitability because banks must allocate 
capital against every off balance sheet activity that they engage in. Thus both net income and 




Gilbert & Wheelock (2007) in a study of ROE as a performance metric highlighted that though ROE 
was frequently used as a measure of bank profitability, the metric could not be used in that capacity 
without sufficient scrutiny on its appropriateness. The authors, in particular, highlighted that 
differences in regulation may have misleading effect on the interpretation of the metric as a 
profitability indicator. Focusing on the American context, Gilbert & Wheelock (2007) suggested that 
small businesses, following implementation of the Subchapter S federal tax code, are not double taxed 
like in the case of larger businesses. This therefore leads to a fallacy in interpretation of ROE as a 
performance metric when assessing the performance of small and large companies. The researcher, in 
the ongoing study, has however ascertained the appropriateness of the metric in the Kenyan context, 
particularly from a regulation point of view, in that all reported metrics are collected from the central 
repository of the regulator with assured homogeneity of regulation as evidenced by reports on the 
various regulation at play across the industry. 
 
Hauswald & Marquez (2006) studied Albania's banking industry to assess the efficiency of banks and 
used net interest margin as a proxy. According to the authors, regulating for equitable competition 
within banking industries must be done with sufficient caution given that excessive competition may 
result in instability. They found a negative relationship to exist between non-performing loans, as 
reported by the various banks, and efficiency. Given that the efficiency of banks has direct implications 
of profitability, they inferred that considering the relationship between non-performing loans and 
metrics of profitability would serve to establish a meaningful relationship that can be leveraged to 
understand trends in profitability. Non-performing loans were considered as control variables in 
regression models devised to assess the change in competition determining variables pre and post 




Polodoo, Seetanah, Sannassee, Seetah & Padachi (2014) posit that non-performing loans have a 
significant effect on the profitability of banks and therefore there is need to assess factors that result 
in defaulting of loans. They studied the Mauritius banking industry and employed four estimation 
techniques namely: Fixed Effects, differenced GMM, System GMM and Random Coefficient 
estimation. Polodoo et al (2014) established that the most critical factors influencing the level of non-
performing loans are decline in the construction sector and rise in cross-boarder loans. The authors 
also identified other macroeconomic contributors, such as inflation and rise in GDP among trading 
partners as important contributory factors in assessing trends in non-performing loans. This study 
includes the highlighted variables namely: gross loans, non-performing loans, GDP and inflation as 
additional explanatory variables in assessing their effect on the profitability of banks. 
 
Mathuva (2009) examined the relationship between bank profitability and the capital adequacy ratios 
and cost to income ratio simulataneously for Kenyan banks between 1998 and 2007. Data was 
collected, analyzed and intepreted using different financial ratios and statistical tools including 
percentages, trend analysis, averages, regression, correlation and the significance test. The study 
yielded several findings. First, that increasing the core capital ratio and tier one risk based capital ratio 
may raise expected earnings by reducing costs of financial distress including bankruptcy. Secondly, 
that a negative relationship existed between the equity capital ratio and profitability. Thirdly, the study 
found that Kenyan banks are not competitive globally in terms of their efficiency as measured by the 
CIR. Fourthly, the CIR was found to be inversely related to the ROA and ROE measures. Fifthly, the 
CIRs of Kenyan banks was found to be higher than those of banks from developed countries. 
 
Goddard et al (2010) examined the determinants of banks’ profitability, and the persistence and 
convergence of profits amongst eight banks in Europe between 1992 and 2007. A dynamic panel 
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estimation model was used with bank profitability being measured as the difference between ROE and 
an estimated cost of capital. Their findings indicated that profitability was higher for the banks that 
were efficient and diversified compared to those that were more focused. Additionally, Goddard et al 
(2010) found that profitability was lower for the banks that were more capitalized. With regards to 
persistence and convergence of profits, the authors found that excess profits persisted from 1992 to 
1998 compared to 1999 to 2007. This was due to an increase in the intensity of bank competition from 
1999 following the integration of the European Union financial markets following the introduction of 
the Euro and implementation of the Financial Services Action Plan. The intensity of competition was 
measured by the speed at which convergence towards long run average profitability was achieved. 
They concluded that competition was effective in eliminating excess profit over time.  
 
Goddard et al (2010) noted that several countries had banks with a higher loan to asset ratio 
outperforming those with a lower ratio. Furthermore, cost efficient banks were more profitable than 
the less efficient banks. They concluded that cost efficiency was a more important factor in 
determining performance than concentration or market share. The authors also found a negative 
relationship to exist between the capital ratio and profitability and interpreted this to mean that the 
opportunity cost of high capitalization reduced shareholder returns. However, they cautioned that 
improvements in competition could be reversed if policy measures to deal with the credit crisis 
prioritize stability over competition and new barriers to competition are introduced by insulating 
incumbent banks from rivalry. 
  
Mehta & Bhavani (2017) sought to establish the determinants of commercial domestic banks’ 
profitability in the United Arab Emirates between 2006 and 2013. A regression analysis using panel 
data was employed. The dependent variable, profitability, was measured using ROE, ROA and Net 
22 
 
Interest Margin (NIM).  Bank specific, industry specific and macroeconomic variables were used to 
represent the independent variables. The bank specific variables used were size, capital adequacy, 
liquidity, cost efficiency, income diversity, asset quality, risk solvency ratios and growth. The industry 
specific variable used was market concentration while the macroeconomic variables used were GDP 
and inflation. The empirical results showed that the cost efficiency, maintaining a high capital 
adequacy ratio, and improving asset quality were the most significant variables affecting profitability 
across all the measures of profitability. Additionally, diversifying income into non-traditional sources 
also enhanced profitability but had a negative impact on NIM. They found GDP to only impact ROA 
and ROE (Mehta & Bhavani, 2017). 
 
Nguyen, Thanh & Nguyen (2018) studied the determinants of the profitability of 13 commercial banks 
in Vietnam from 2006 to 2015 in a bid to understand the condition of the banking sector to assist in 
launching suitable policies. Panel data regression analysis was used for the analysis. The dependent 
variables used to measure profitability were ROE, ROA and NIM. The independent variables included 
bank specific and macroeconomic variables of 19 domestic banks. The bank specific variables that 
were examined are size, liquidity, capital adequacy, ownership structure, credit risk and cost to income 
ratio. The macroeconomic variables studied were GDP and inflation. Based on their empirical 
analysis, Nguyen et al (2018) found that capital structure was positively related to NIM and liquidity 
was positively related to ROE. Cost to income ratio was found to have a significantly negative effect 
on all the measures of profitability, whereby a negative correlation represents efficiency and higher 
profits. Credit risk and foreign ownership also negatively affected profitability. Capital structure only 
a recorded a negative effect for the ROE measure while liquidity had a negative effect on both NIM 
and ROE measures. State ownership, size of assets, GDP and inflation did not yield any obvious 




Kamau & Were (2013) sought to find out the drivers of the splendid banking sector performance in 
Kenya between 1997 and 2011. Specifically, they focused on finding out whether the bank 
performance was driven by bank structure or operating efficiency. They carried out their study using 
the SCP approach and Data Envelopment Analysis. The found that the source of superior performance 
in the Kenyan banking sector emanated from structure and collusive power and not efficiency. They 
postulated that high concentration and relative market powers resulted in high profitability and 
suggested decreasing the high concentration and market powers to reduce the superior profits and 
hence make the banking sector more competitive. Additionally, they also proposed that efficiency be 
increased by improving operating scale to reduce market concentration and in effect make the banking 
sector to be more competitive. They implied that increasing the size of banks would result in 
economies of scale and scope. They proposed for policies fostering decrease in concentration and 
relative market powers to be instituted to make the banking sector more competitive and redistribute 
profitability more evenly amongst the players. They suggested that policy directives for instance 
increasing capital and liquidity requirements, and deposit insurance premiums could increase the size 
of banks and level out the relative market power of the players thereby foster competitive pricing and 
operational efficiency. 
 
Qin & Pastory (2012) examined the profitability of three Tanzanian commercial banks from 2000 to 
2009. They ran a regression model to determine whether there was a significant relationship between 
profitability, measured by ROA, and several independent variables namely: capital adequacy, liquidity 
and asset quality. They found that the banks had stable profitability and that there was no significant 
difference in probability amongst the banks studied. This was explained by the presence of market 
dominance amongst the three banks that were studied. The regression model also revealed that 
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liquidity and asset quality positively impacted profitability. Capital adequacy and Non-Performing 
Loans (NPLs) were found to have negative impact on profitability. 
 
Tan & Floros (2012) examined the determinants of profitability of Chinese banking sector between 
the period 2003 to 2009. They investigated the effects of bank specific, industry specific and 
macroeconomic variables on profitability of 101 Chinese banks. They used the Generalized Method of 
Moments model using unbalanced panel data set to investigate the determinants of profitability. Their 
empirical findings indicated that bank profitability was positively related to cost efficiency and higher 
banking and stock market development. Conversely, bank profitability was found to be negatively 
related to high taxes, high levels of capital, higher GDP growth and high level of non-performing 
loans. Specifically, Banks that had higher level of cost efficiency and lower taxes had high 
profitability. Tan et al (2012) proposed for several policy implications to improve profitability 
specifically controlling overhead cost so as increase efficiency; controlling loan issuance to high risk 
clients; setting up of policies by government to lower economic development; reduction of banks 
capital by the banking regulatory authority and reduction of banking sector taxes by the government 
and liberalizing the financial system. 
 
2.4 Literature Review Summary and Research Gap 
Literature review presents determinants of market power to be mainly bank specific factors as well as 
structural and macroeconomic factors and recommends for policies to be put in place to foster 
contestability and in effect boost competition which is expected to diminish market power of dominant 
players (Nekatibeb 2012, Sanya & Gartner 2012, Simpasa 2010). Simpasa (2010) suggested that 
greater market concentration increased the market power of banks which in turn influenced their ability 
to set prices. Tabak et al (2012) found that banks with increasing market power engaged in riskier 
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activities. However, where banks with high market power increased their capital, they became more 
conservative and reduced their risky behaviour to protect their equity capital. However, it is not clear 
on the impact of a regulatory increase on minimum core capital requirements for the entire industry 
on market power and in turn on the level of competition. While there is consensus amongst various 
authors that market concentration does influence market power, a knowledge gap exists on the effect 
of core capital on market power and in turn on competition. The National Treasury had envisioned 
that increasing the core capital would decrease the number of banks through mergers hence decrease 
their respective market power and in turn boost competition in the sector. 
 
Several authors have studied the determinants of profitability classifying them as bank specific, 
industry specific and macroeconomic variables. While a couple of the above authors have similar 
findings on the determinants of profitability being efficiency, diversification of revenue, size of the 
bank and higher asset quality, the effect of capital on profitability seems to elicit divergent findings 
(Goddard et al. 2010, Kamau & Were 2013, Mehta & Bhavani 2017, Nguyen et al 2018, Qin & Pastory 
2012 and Tan & Floros 2012). Mehta & Bhavani (2017) found that maintaining a high capital 
adequacy ratio significantly affected profitability positively for all the measures of profits. Mathuva 
(2009) found that simultaneously increasing the CAR and improving the CIR improved the ROA and 
ROE for Kenyan banks. Nguyen et al (2018) found that capital structure was positively related to NIM 
but had a negative effect on ROE. Tan et al (2012) found that bank profitability was negatively affected 
by high levels of capital and recommended for the Chinese banking regulatory authority to reduce the 
banks’ capital requirement. Similarly, Goddard et al (2010) found that profitability was lower for the 
European banks that were more capitalized. Capital adequacy was found to have negative impact on 
profitability of Tanzanian banks (Qin & Pastory 2012). Mehta & Bhavani (2017) and Nguyen et al 
(2018) noted different findings on the relationship between capital structure and profitability based on 
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the measure of profitability that was used. A knowledge gap does exist on the effect of core capital on 
profitability and in turn on competition. Additionally, most studies have been done at the industry 
level and not at the tier peer groups that this study employs. 
 
To the best of my knowledge, there is no study comparing the performance of the Kenyan banking 
sector pre and post implementation of higher core capital requirements in 2008. This study will 
therefore be useful in evaluating the effect of increasing core capital on competition and profitability 
by comparing the pre and post implementation periods. 
 
2.5 Conceptual Framework 
Core capital is the independent variable which affects the dependent variables competition and 
profitability in the banking sector. The conceptual framework diagram is presented in Figure 2.1 
below: 
Figure 2.1: Conceptual Framework 
 
The conceptual framework implies that a policy change in the level of the minimum core capital 
requirement could have a positive, neutral or negative effect on competition and profitablity of banks. 
The National Treasury expected that bank performance would increase as a result of increasing the 




Independent Variable Dependent Variable
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period pre and post increasing the minimum core capital requirement to establish whether the increase 
in core capital had an effect on the level of competition and profitability.  
 
Wong & Wong (2001) in addressing the anticipated effect of China's move to allow for participation 
of foreign banking entities suggested that market share is determined by a multiplicity of factors that 
go beyond regulation. The effects of regulation; though possible, would be affected by other market-
specific factors such as institutional inter-arrangements and directed lending in the Chinese context. 
Rimaviciute & Vilys (2014) however posit that the level of competition in a bank is, to a large extent, 
affected by the number of players in control of the market share and therefore, achieving a fair balance 
within a banking industry would involve implementation of well-crafted regulations. To analyze the 
effect of increasing core capital on competition in the Kenyan banking sector, the following hypothesis 
was arrived at in appreciation of these opposing views emerging from literature: 
 
Ho1: The market power means of the two populations, that is pre- and post-higher core capital 
requirements, are equal hence there was no significant change in competition; and 
 
Ha1: The market power means of the two populations, that is pre- and post-higher core capital 
requirements, are not equal hence there was significant change in competition. 
 
Polodoo et al (2014) highighted that bank perfromance as assessed through various metrics, such as 
ROE, is affected by several factors and is therefore impossible to establish regulation that would 
address all factets resulting in variability in competition. However, Joanna et al (2013) in a 
comparative study of regulation in Canada and USA postulated that well crafted regulations may serve 
to enhance competitiveness in the banking industry as has been the case in Canada whereby 
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profitability is dispersed among multiple players in the banking industry. To investigate the effect of 
increasing core capital on profitability in the Kenyan banking sector, the following hypothesis was 
derived from the two posited arguments and served as the basis for analysis in this study:  
 
Ho2: The ROE means of the two populations, that is pre- and post-higher core capital requirements, 
are equal hence there was no significant change in profitability; and 
 
Ha2: The ROE means of the two populations, that is pre- and post-higher core capital requirements, 





CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the methodology that was adopted for the study. It covers the following: research 
approach and design; population and sampling; data collection; data analysis; research quality and 
ethical considerations. 
 
3.2 Research Design  
This research studied the performance of the Kenyan banking industry for the period 2003 to 2016. 
The research adopted an exploratory study approach as it sought to gain useful insights on the effect 
of increasing core capital on banking performance in Kenya. The study took an exploratory approach 
given the nascence of the approach to regulation within the Kenyan context; that is there had not been 
prior adjustments to the capital requirements within the industry hence the effect resulting could not 
be investigated or anticipated based on data or previous research from the Kenyan market. The study 
applied a quantitative approach and reviewed available secondary data. The research compared the 
period prior to the 2008 increase in minimum core capital requirement, that is 2003 to 2008, to the 
period post the increase that is 2009 to 2016.  
 
3.3 Data Collection Methods 
The study relied on a quantitative approach and used secondary data. The use of secondary data 
enables panel studies to be carried out since it resolves the problems of costs and time constraints in 
collecting data (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, 2012). The study used available published data for 39 
commercial banks for the period 2003 to 2016. This represents 93 % of the licensed banks in Kenya.  
The 39 commercial banks listed by the CBK as at 31st December 2016 are presented in Appendix A. 
This list excludes three banks that are either under receivership, under statutory management or in 
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receivership. Owing to the small population size, there was no sampling and the entire population was 
studied. The specific data that was used is core capital, ROE and net assets. Additional data that was 
used to represent control variables in the regression equations are gross loans and advances, non-
performing loans, profit before tax, gross economic growth and inflation. This data was also obtained 
from CBK’s Bank Supervision Annual Reports. Comparative research may be possible where 
comparable data is available (Saunders et al, 2012). Relying on published data from one source that is 
the CBK enabled comparison of the pre and post introduction of the 2008 increase in minimum core 
capital requirement. 
 
3.4 Data Analysis and Presentation 
Data was analysed according to the three peer groups as provided by CBK. The simple average figures 
of the banks in each peer group was used to represent the average for the respective group. Descriptive 
statistics have been presented to highlight trends in data for the various variables under study. 
 
Profitability was measured using ROE. Berger & Bouwman (2013) define ROE as net income divided 
by shareholders equity. The authors argue that ROE is a comprehensive measure of profitability since 
both net income and shareholders’ funds reflect on- and off-balance sheet activities. The authors 
further highlight the view that banks must allocate capital against every activity the engage in whether 
on- or off- balance sheet hence making the ROE measure of profitability to be comprehensive. 
 
The Herfindahl Hirschman Index (HHI) was used to compute the market power. The basis of 
computing the HHI was the net assets which was used to compute the market share of each bank in 
the industry. The HHI was thereafter be computed for each year from 2003 to 2016 as the sum of the 
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where Sn is the market share of firm n where n=1, 2, … and n.  
 
However, the HHI has a limitation in that its value depends on the size of the industry such that a 
smaller number of banks in the industry would imply high market concentration which may not 
necessarily be the case. This is corrected by including the natural log of the number of banks in the 
market to the relationship between the H statistic and the HHI. It is however noteworthy that this 
correction was applied as a cautionary measure given that banks in Kenya are considered 
overpopulated in comparison to other African countries like Nigeria and South Africa (Cytonn 
Investment, 2015). 
 
The dataset was paired with pairings being between the period 2003 to 2014 such that each pre 2008 
year would be paired with a post 2008 year in ascending order. The regresssion and descriptive models 
would however include all post 2008 data in analyzing trends for the post-regualtion period. 
 
To respond to the postulated hypotheses, data was analysed using the paired t-test and multi variate 
regression equations. A paired t-test was conducted to assess whether there was a change in 
competition in the banking sector following introduction of higher minimum core capital 
requirements. A paired t-test examines the means of individual differences of paired measurements 
and is therefore appropriate for pre-and post-situations (Park, 2009). The paired t-test is also 
appropriate in assessing two populations based on their means in cases where observations in either 
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dataset cannot be rendered as independent observations (Park, 2009). This test was chosen since the 
independence of the two study periods that is, pre- and post-2008, could not be established given that 
most banks in operation prior to the introduction of the higher capital requirements remained in the 
industry. This test compared profitability and market power given the level of core capital for the 
period 2003 to 2008 against the period 2009 to 2016.  
 
Regression equations were formulated to assess whether there was a change in the relationship 
between the variables under study within the pre and post regulation periods. These models were used 
to shed light on the possible effects of regulation as a change in the relationship would be attributed 
to the change in regulation. Observed changes in relationships could be used to inform the potential 
impact of future increases in core capital, which is a topical issue in parliament. 
 
Standard multiple linear regression equations were computed for each of the two periods with the 
intention of assessing any changes in association of variables. The significance value attached to each 
coefficient was used to assess its validity at alpha 0.05. The equations took the following forms:  
For competition: 
HHI= a + b1CC + b2TD + b3PBT + b4GEG + b5I + e 
Where: 
HHI = HHI 
‘a’ = represents the y-intercept; 
‘b1’ = magnitude of change in HHI with change in CC 
‘CC’ = Core Capital 
‘b2’ = magnitude of change in HHI with change in TD 
‘TD’ = Total Deposits 
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‘b3’ = magnitude of change in HHI with change in PBT 
‘PBT’ = Profit Before Tax 
‘b4’ = Magnitude of change in HHI with change in GEG 
‘GDP’ = Gross Economic Growth 
‘b5’ = Magnitude of change in HHI with change in I 
‘I’ = Inflation 
‘e’ = error term 
For profitability: 
ROE= a + b1CC + b2TD + b3 PBT + b4GEG + b5I + e 
ROE = ROE 
‘a’ = represents the y-intercept; 
‘b1’ = magnitude of change in ROE with change in CC 
‘CC’ = Core Capital 
‘b2’ = magnitude of change in ROE with change in TD 
‘TD’ = Total Deposits 
‘b3’ = magnitude of change in ROE with change in PBT 
‘PBT’ = Profit Before Tax 
‘b4’ = Magnitude of change in ROE with change in GEG 
‘GEG’ = Gross Economic Growth 
‘b5’ = Magnitude of change in ROE with change in I 
‘I’ = Inflation 





The tools that were used to carry out the analysis are the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences 
(SPSS) software and Microsoft Excel 365/XLSTAT. 
 
3.5 Measurement of Variables 
The table below presents the measurement of variables used in the study 
Variable Measurement 
Core Capital (CC) The total shareholders’ funds 
Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) 
Annual percentage change in the gross domestic product 
Gross Loans and Advances 
(GLA) 
Gross loans and advances to customers before allowances for 
impairment 






That is the sum of the square of the market shares of all the banks 
in the respective peer group 
Inflation Annual percentage increase in the level of prices of goods and 
services 
Market share Total assets of each bank divided by the total assets for all the banks 
in the respective peer group 
Profit before tax Profits before deducting tax 
Return on Equity (ROE) Net profit divided by total shareholders’ funds 
Total Deposits (TD) Total deposits received from government, parastatals, private 
sector and individuals 
 
3.6 Research Quality 
Research quality is assured by ensuring that research findings established can be said to have reliability 
and validity. According to Saunders et al (2012), “reliability refers to whether your data collection 
techniques and analytic procedures would produce consistent findings if they were repeated in another 
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occasion or if they were replicated by a different researcher”. Reliability will be assured in this study 
by having a clear research methodology which details the data analysis procedure. Additionally, 
adopting quantitative research methods fosters reliability, objectivity and independence of the 
researcher. 
This research focused on 39 banks over a period of thirteen years hence sufficient data will be collected 
to ensure the validity of inferences to be presented. Data to be used for analysis is provided by the 
CBK hence boosting data quality. Further, adoption of a quantitative approach will boost internal 
validity for example absence of participants in the study will mitigate threats to internal validity which 
might be affected by threat of the impact of past or recent events which changes participants 
perceptions and present a threat of incorrect responses. 
“External validity refers to the ability to generalize research findings to other relevant groups” 
(Saunders et al, 2012). External validity will be enhanced by using data from all the 39 commercial 
banks in Kenya as at 31st December 2016. This will boost the ability of the findings of this study to 
be used to predict the effect of future core capital increases in the banking sector.  
 
3.7  Ethical Considerations 
The study takes a retrospective data analysis approach; as such, information collected will be from 
published information that is publicly available. This approach thereby eliminates chances of 
breaching participants’ confidentiality and anonymity. The collection of data primarily from the CBK 
repository further ensures that possible negative depictions of institutions are not arrived at because of 




CHAPTER 4: PRESENTATION OF FINDINGS 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the findings from the data analysis. The chapter is divided into three main 
sections namely: descriptive statistics, inferential statistics and regression analysis.  
4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
This section provides graphic representation of data to allow for highlighting of trends within the 
various datasets. 
4.2.1 Competition 
Data was collected and stratified according to the three peer groups as indicated in Appendix B. Graphs 
were then created to indicate the general trends for the various peer groups to provide a basis of 
comparison. Figures 4.1 to 4.3 indicate the trends for the various peer groups. 
Figure 4.1 lnHHI Peer Group One 
 
The general trend from 2003 to 2016 in the InHHI dataset presents a decline in market concentration 
indicating an increase in competition amongst peer group one banks. On average, peer group one had 













InHHI Peer Group One
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the highest level of market power amongst the three peer groups over the thirteen years as indicated 
by an average lnHHI of 6.44. The trend was further investigated to assess pre and post-regulation 
behaviour. Figures 4.2 and 4.3 provide the output derived from the segmented data. 
Figure 4.2 Pre-Regulation Peer Group One 
 
The trendline generated for the pre-regulation period, with change in HHI viewed as a function of 
time, indicated a coefficient of -0.0547. There was a general decline in competition for the stipulated 
period. 
Figure 4.3 Post Regulation Peer Group One 
 
 
An analysis of the general trend in competition in the peer group one as indicated by HHI in the post 
regulation period indicated a less steep decline in competition as assessed from the trendline indicating 
competition (InHHI) as a function of time. This indicates that the general decline in competition was 
less pronounced in the post regulation period. 


























Figure 4.4 InHHI Peer Group Two  
 
According to the trend observed in peer group two between 2003 and 2016, there was a gradual 
increase in market power among the banks in this category. The trend in this peer group contrasted 
with that of peer group one banks which were generally observed to decrease in market power.  Peer 
group two banks had a lower average lnHHI of 4.27 over the thirteen-year period compared to peer 
group one bank’s average of 6.44. However, peer group two had a higher average lnHHI than peer 
group three banks which averaged 1.18. To assess the general trend between the two periods, further 
graphs were generated and are presented in figures 4.5 and 4.6. 
Figure 4.5 Pre-Regulation Peer Group Two 
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The coefficient, with change in HHI as a function of time, for the pre-regulation period was -0.0168 
thereby indicating a general increase in competition within the peer group two. This indicated that 
prior to implementation of the regulation, there was a general increase in competition hence the effect 
of the regulation would be viewed in light of this pre-existing trend. 
Figure 4.6 Post-Regulation Peer Group Two 
 
The coefficient, for the post-regulation period was 0.0241 indicating an increase in HHI with time. 
Contrasting this with the prior observed decline in competition in the pre-regulation period, it may be 
viewed that the regulation had an unanticipated impact for this peer group. 





















Figure 4.7 InHHI Peer Group Three 
 
The HHI index increased in all years except 2005 to 2007 for the peer group three banks between 2003 
and 2016. The overall increase in the HHI represents declining competition amongst the banks in this 
peer group. Overall, the increase in market power over the years was significantly steeper than that 
observed in the peer group 2 banks. However, on average, peer group three banks had the lowest level 
of HHI between 2003 and 2016 of 1.18. This implies that this is the most competitive peer group 
amongst the three groups. A further analysis of the data for the two periods is presented in figures 4.8 
and 4.9. 
Figure 4.8 Pre-Regulation Peer Group Three 
 

















InHHI Peer Group Three















There was a general decline in market power for the peer group leading up to 2008. This is inferred 
from the -0.2042 coefficient with competition (InHHI) viewed as a function of time. This therefore 
indicates that there was a trend towards decrease in disparity in market share for the peer group. 
Figure 4.9 Post-Regulation Peer Group Three 
 
Following the introduction of the regulation, it was observed that there was an increase in HHI within 
the group as inferred from the 0.0612 coefficient with competition viewed as a function of time. From 
the observation, it may be inferred that the regulation may contribute to a decrease in competition 
within the peer group. 
4.2.2 Profitability 
This section provides graphical representations of the trends observed in profitability of the banks by 
according to each peer group. 
A pre and post analysis of trends in profitability indicated that there was a general increase in 
profitability in the pre-regulation period and a decline in profitability in the post regulation period 
among peer group one banks. This is indicated by the coefficients of 0.9158 and -0.0922 for the pre 
and post regulation periods respectively. This therefore indicated that there was a decrease in ROE for 




















the peer group following introduction of the regulation. The ROE trends for the pre and post regulation 
period for peer group one banks are presented in figures 4.10 and 4.11. 
Figure 4.10 Pre-Regulation Peer Group One  
 
Figure 4.11 Post-Regulation Peer Group One 
 
 
A trend analysis of profitability among peer group two banks indicated an increase in ROE during the 
pre-regulation period. This trend however revered following introduction of regulations thereby 
indicating that there was a decrease in profitability within this peer group. The pre and post regulation 
trend analysis of ROE is presented in figures 4.12 and 4.13. 































Figure 4.12 Pre-Regulation Peer Group Two  
 
Figure 4.13 Post-Regulation Peer Group Two 
 
A similar profitability trend analysis for peer group three banks was carried out. Both pre and post-
regulation periods experienced a decline in ROE. The decline was however steeper following the 
introduction of regulation thereby indicating this may have had a negative impact on profitability 
within the peer group. The trends are presented in figures 4.14 and 4.15 






























Figure 4.14 Pre-Regulation Peer Group Three 
 
Figure 4.15 Post-Regulation Peer Group Three 
 
4.3 Inferential Statistics 
This section assesses the hypothesis constructed for the study. A total of four literature-derived 
hypothesis were put forward in assessing profitability and competition in the industry. These are 
addressed herein. 
The two hypotheses put forward in assessing competition are: 
Ho1: The market power means of the two populations, that is pre- and post-higher core capital 
requirements, are equal hence there was no significant change in competition; and 
 

































Ha1: The market power means of the two populations, that is pre- and post-higher core capital 
requirements, are not equal hence there was significant change in competition. 
 
The hypotheses put forward in assessing profitability are: 
Ho2: The ROE means of the two populations, that is pre- and post-higher core capital requirements, 
are equal hence there was no significant change in profitability; and 
Ha2: The ROE means of the two populations, that is pre- and post-higher core capital requirements, 
are not equal hence there was significant change in profitability. 
 
To address the hypotheses, paired Student's T-tests were conducted. Tables 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 provide a 
summary of the resulting test statistics for the three groups. 









Interval of the 
Difference 
t df Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Lower Upper 
Peer Group One 0.28 0.10 0.04 0.18 0.38 7.034 5 0.001 
Peer Group Two -0.01 0.20 0.08 -0.22 0.21 -0.094 5 0.929 














Interval of the 
Difference 
t df Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Lower Upper 
Peer Group One -1.44 3.78 1.54 -5.41 2.52 -0.936 5 0.392 
Peer Group Two 0.86 6.87 2.80 -6.35 8.07 0.308 5 0.770 
Peer Group Three 0.28 3.26 1.33 -3.14 3.71 0.212 5 0.841 
 
The three peer groups were assessed for difference in competition (InHHI) and profitability (ROE) in 
the pre and post-regulation periods. Results indicated that only peer one had a significant change in 
competition within the period (t-statistic 7.034 and significance value lower that 0.01); neither peer 
group two nor three showed a significant change in competition during the periods as the means of the 
two periods were assessed to be of no statistically inferred difference. The alternative hypothesis 
indicating difference in the means of the two populations for competition was thereby accepted for 
peer group one. The null hypothesis of no difference could not be rejected for peer group two and 
three as pertains to both competition and profitability whereas for all groups, the null hypothesis of no 
difference in the means of the two periods for profitability could not be rejected. 
4.4 Regression Analysis 
Regression analysis was applied to assess pre and post regulation relationship between the dependent 
variables ROE and HHI and the independent variables core capital, total deposits, profit before tax, 
inflation and growth in GDP. Computation of the regression model for both dependent variables with 
the inclusion of all variables indicated an R-square value of 1 thereby pointing to the possible existence 
of multi-collinearity in the dataset. To address the concern, the financial indicators where regressed 
independently of the macro-economic indicators (GDP and Inflation) to assess the effect of the various 
variables in two distinct models per period; this addressed the multi-collinearity concern. The resulting 
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pre and post coefficients for banking and macroeconomic indicators are compared in subsequent sub-
sections. 
4.4.1 Competition 
The influence of the various dependent variables in the pre and post-regulation periods was varied as 
indicated by the changes in coefficients. As depicted in table 4.3, the y-intercept (the base HHI value 
when all independent variables were at 0) changed from 1,305.51 to 573.057 between the pre and post 
regulation periods respectively for peer group one banks, 128.66 to 58.94 for peer group two banks 
and 12.34 to 1.95 in peer group three banks. The y-intercept was the only significant coefficient. The 
general trend in decrease in HHI across the peer groups, as indicated by the decrease in the intercept, 
therefore indicated that there was a change in the relationship between the variables in the two periods. 
In assessing the relationship between the macroeconomic indicators as explanatory variables to 
changes in competition, it emerged that, as with banking-sector metrics, the y-intercept was the only 
statistically significant coefficient at alpha 0.05. The changes in the base value (y-intercept) across the 
two periods – pre and post regulation – as indicated in table 4.4 were 545.38 to 555.94 for the peer 
group one, 105.54 to 62.4, and 2.285 to 3.711 for peer groups two and three respectively. This therefore 
indicated that there was a change in the relationship between the variables in the peer groups in the 


















R-square 0.768 0.428 
 
Coefficients P-value Coefficients P-value 
Intercept 1305.51 0.05 573.057 0.00 
Core capital 0 1.00 0.009 0.21 
Total deposits -0.01 0.40 0.002 0.24 










R-square 0.442 0.814 
 
Coefficients P-value Coefficients P-value 
Intercept 128.66 0.23 58.94 0 
Core capital 0.02 0.41 0 0.16 
Total deposits -0.01 0.43 0 0.09 
Profit before tax 0.06 0.55 0 0.8 










R-square 0.573 0.966 
 
Coefficients P-value Coefficients P-value 
Intercept 12.34 0.21 1.95 0 
Core capital 0.03 0.45 0 0.31 
Total deposits -0.01 0.34 0 0.68 
Profit before tax 0.01 0.84 0.01 0.07 













 R-square 0.263 0.008  
Coefficients P-value Coefficients P-value 
Intercept 545.38 0.12 555.94 0.00 
GDP-Pre 14.6 0.68 -0.05 1.00 














Coefficients P-value Coefficients P-value 
Intercept 105.54 0 62.4 0 
GDP-Pre -2.59 0.13 1.81 0.24 














Coefficients P-value Coefficients P-value 
Intercept 2.285 0.611 3.711 0.018 
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GDP-Pre -0.22 0.696 0.098 0.609 
Inflation-Pre 0.165 0.442 -0.022 0.719 
 
4.4.2 Profitability 
The influence of the various dependent variables in the pre and post-regulation periods, as was with 
the case with competition, was different as assessed by the coefficients of the various explanatory 
variables as depicted in table 4.5.  The y-intercept (the base ROE value when all independent variables 
were at 0) changed from 21.57 to 31.752 between the pre and post regulation periods respectively for 
peer group one banks, 11.314 to 25.206 for peer group two banks and 4.463 to 10.757 in peer group 
three banks. The y-intercept was the only significant coefficient. The general trend in increase in ROE 
across the peer groups, as indicated by the increase in the intercept, therefore indicated that there was 
a significant change in the relationship between the variables over the two periods. This difference 
could be as a result of the change in regulation. However, it is important to note that the intercept was 
the only statistically valid coefficient at alpha 0.05. In assessing the relationship between the 
macroeconomic indicators as explanatory variables to changes in profitability, it emerged that, as with 
banking-sector metrics, the y-intercept was the only statistically significant coefficient at alpha 0.05. 
The changes in the base value (y-intercept) across the two periods – pre and post regulation – as 
indicated in table 4.6 were 33.86 to 29.36 for the peer group one, 29.36 to 15.36, and 9.86 to 3.06 for 
peer groups two and three respectively. This therefore indicated that the general relationship between 
the variables changed between the two periods; this change may be attributed to the change in core-
capital requirements. It is however noteworthy that the intercept was the only significant determinant 
in the model except for total deposits and profit before tax or peer group three banks in the post 
regulation period. Full disclosure of results are provided in Appendix C. 





















Coefficients P-value Coefficients P-value 
Intercept 21.57 0.19 31.752427 0.00 
Core capital 0.002606 0.22 -0.000075 0.88 
Total deposits -0.000157 0.79 -0.000003 0.97 
















Coefficients P-value Coefficients P-value 
Intercept 11.314 0.378 25.206 0.01 
Core capital 0.003 0.325 -0.002 0.465 
Total deposits 0 0.914 0 0.882 















Coefficients P-value Coefficients P-value 
Intercept 4.463 0.674 10.757 0.002 
Core capital -0.012 0.798 0.003 0.235 
Total deposits 0.003 0.826 -0.003 0.012 
Profit before tax 0.083 0.219 0.081 0.004 





















Coefficients P-value Coefficients P-value 
Intercept 33.86 0.02 29.36 0.00 
GDP-Pre 0.23 0.83 0.3 0.59 














Coefficients P-value Coefficients P-value 
Intercept 29.36 0.1 15.36 0.07 
GDP-Pre -0.11 0.94 0.08 0.95 














Coefficients P-value Coefficients P-value 
Intercept 9.86 0.2 3.06 0.59 
GDP-Pre 0.71 0.42 0.73 0.46 









CHAPTER FIVE: DISCUSSION, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents a discussion of the data analysis, conclusions, recommendations and areas for 
further studies. The objectives of the study were two-fold namely: to analyse the effect of increasing 
core capital on competition and to investigate the effect of increasing core capital on profitability in 
the Kenyan banking sector. 
5.2 Discussion 
This section provides an explanation of the various findings for each objective considering the 
literature review. 
5.2.1 The Effect of Increasing Core Capital on Competition in the Kenyan Banking Sector 
The descriptive assessment of trends in competition indicated a general decline in market power 
among peer group one banks and a general increase in peer group two and three banks. However, for 
peer group two, it was observed that the general increase was attributed to increase in post regulation 
increases as the pre-regulation period observed a decrease in HHI. This therefore indicates that there 
was higher market concentration in the post-regulation period than in the pre-regulation period. The 
regulation, particularly for this peer group, did not seem to have a positive impact on competition. 
This finding is in keeping with Wong & Wong's (2001) observations that increase in competition 
within an industry requires more than regulation and as such, factors like collusions may result in 
decreased competition even though policies combating competition may be at play. Inferencing based 
on the two hypotheses in assessing competition indicated that there was a significant change in 
competition in peer group one following introduction of regulation. From the regression equations 
assessing the relationship between banking and macroeconomic metrics in the pre and post-regulation 
periods, it emerged that, as deduced from the significant coefficients, that there was a marked change 
in the relationship between the metrics. This change however, could have arisen from many factors 
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including the change in core-capital requirements. This finding is in line with Joanna’s et al (2013) 
observation that well-crafted regulations serve to decrease deleterious market power. However, given 
that the change in competition was observed solely for the first group as inferred from the t-test results, 
it was observed that the benefits may not have been felt by the lower peer groups. In relating these 
findings to the Modigliani-Miller Theorem, the changes in competition and profitability within the 
industry may be attributed to changes in the sourcing of finances to adhere to the core-capital 
requirements instituted by the change in regulation. The marginal change in competition observed in 
peer group two therefore indicate that the market structure, according to the Neo-Classical theory, 
tends towards an oligopoly as changes in regulation intended to increase the competitive ability of 
peer group two banks did not have the anticipated effect. 
5.2.2 The Effect of Increasing Core Capital on Profitability in the Kenyan Banking Sector 
The findings as depicted in descriptive statistics indicate that there is a general upward trend in ROE 
for pre-regulation periods as observed in peer groups one and two. This trend was however not 
observed in peer group three banks. In the post regulation periods, all three tier groups observed an 
average decline in ROE thereby indicating a possible negative effect on profitability resulting from 
introduction of the core capital regulations. However, as observed through the Paired-T-test results, it 
emerged that there was no statistically significant difference between the means of the three groups 
over the pre and post-regulation periods. However, as was the case with competition, all pre and post 
regression equations differed markedly in the composition of the explanatory variables and magnitude 
as deduced from the significant coefficients. This indicates that there was a change in profitability in 
the industry between the pre and post regulation period. This change however, could have arisen from 
many factors including the change in core-capital requirements.  The general finding of decrease in 
profitability for peer group three banks is contrary to postulations by Kamau & Were (2013) who 
indicated that Kenyan banks remain profitable despite poor economic conditions. The mixed findings 
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are however in keeping with those put forward by Tan & Floros (2014) who indicated that the 
multiplicty of factors at play in a local economy render individual cause-and-effect models improbable 
and therefore establishing a casue-and-effect model for sole factors, such as regulation, may not be 
feasible. As inferred from the Neo-Classical and Structure Conduct Performance theories, peer group 
one banks continue to enjoy growing profitability possibly due to their control of the market by virtue 
of their high market shares. 
5.3 Conclusion 
The main objective of the study was the assess the change in competition and profitability, or lack 
thereof following the introduction of higher core capital requirements in 2008. The findings from the 
objectives assessing the two metrics, that is competition and profitability, indicated that the only 
statistically valid difference in competition, as indicated by HHI, was among peer group one banks, 
and that no statistically valid difference was observed in profitability of peer groups one through three 
for the period. This therefore indicated that the effectiveness of regulation could generally not be 
substantiated by differences in HHI and profitability means over the period for all peer groups. 
Regression equations for the relationship between the dependent variables HHI and ROE and the 
independent variables of core capital, profit before tax, total deposits, inflation and change in GDP 
however indicated that the contribution of each variable to respective dependent variables was varied 
over the two time periods. The coefficients for the variables were not significant at alpha 0.05 for the 
independent variables. 
The trends assessment of the two metrics generally indicates that regulations, may not necessarily be 
viewed as having a directly inferable effect on competition and profitability. As observed from the 
trends in HHI and ROE, it was viewed that in both cases, most peer groups indicated an increase and 
decline, respectively, in the metrics therefore indicating a tendency towards decreased market 
concentration and profitability following an increase in core capital. The observed trend in decline in 
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ROE among peer group three banks was particularly noteworthy as regulations were aimed at 
improving the competitiveness of smaller banks. It was however observed that the reported ROEs 
following the 2008 regulations showed a steeper decline than they did pre-2008. This observation was 
further emphasized by trends in peer group two banks which observed an increasing trend in ROE pre-
2008 but a decreasing trend post 2008. It is however noteworthy that the factors affecting the 
profitability and competition of banks are not restricted to regulation and thus the effectiveness of the 
regulation cannot be solely inferred from the aforementioned trends.  
5.4 Recommendations 
The findings therefore indicate that the regulatory approach in the industry may require modification 
to be more efficacious. The effect of increasing core capital affected the banking performance 
measures of competition and profitability for the different peer groups in different ways. The regulator 
could therefore explore the possibility of having some policies differentiated according to each peer 
group requirement while still maintaining other policies to cover the entire banking industry. 
5.5 Limitations and Areas for Further Study 
The main limitation observed in this study was the glaring size differential of the different banks in 
the industry hence the study could not be done at an industry level. Secondly, bank level data was 
could not be fully provided by the CBK due to legal constraints that limit the institution from availing 
certain data of the banks. Additionally, a gap was identified in the variability of the regression models 
generated. The equations differed widely in composition of explanatory variables and magnitude 
therefore indicating the presence of intervening variables that hinder the accurate depiction of 
relationships between the variables under study. It is therefore necessary for further studies to be 
conducted to assess the underlying factors behind the variability in both pre and post-regulation 
regression models so as to gain deeper understanding into the relationship between the various 




Akomea, S. Y., & Adusei, M. (2013). Bank Recapitalization and Market Concentration in Ghana's 
Banking Industry: A Herfindahl-Hirschman Index Analysis. Global Journal of Busines 
Research, 31-45. 
Berger, A., & Bouwman, C. (2013). How Does Capital Affect Bank Performance During Financial 
Crises? Journal of Financial Economics, 147-176. 
Central Bank of Kenya. (2003 to 2016). Bank Supervision Annual Report. Nairobi: Central Bank of 
Kenya. 
Cytonn Investments. (2015). Kenya Listed Commercial Banks Analysis: Cytonn Q3 2015 Banking 
Sector Report . Nairobi : Cytonn Investments. 
Fungacova, Z., Solanko, L., & Weill, L. (2010). Market power in the Russian banking industry. 
Economie Internationale, 154. 
Goddard, J., Liu, H., Molyneux, P., & Wilson, J. (2010). Do Banks Profits Converge? Gwynedd: 
Bangor Business School, Bangor University. 
Gudmundsson, R., Ngoka-Kisinguh, K., & Odongo, M. T. (2013). The Role of Capital Requirements 
on Bank Competition and Stability: The Case of the Kenyan Banking Industry. Nairobi: 
Kenya Bankers Association. 
Kamau, A., & Were, M. (2013). What Drives Banking Sector Performance in Kenya? Global 
Business and Economics Research Journal, 45-59. 
Keat, P., Young, P., & Erfle, S. (2014). Managerial Economics: Economic Tools for Today's 
Decision Makers. Essex: Pearson. 
56 
 
Mathuva, D. (2009). Capital Adequacy, Cost Income Ratio and the Performance of Commercial 
Banks: The Kenyan Scenario. The International Journal of Applied Economics and Finance, 
35-47. 
Mehta, A., & Bhavani, G. (2017). What Determines Banks' Profitability? Evidence from Emerging 
Markets - The Case of the UAE Banking Sector. Dubai: Institute of Management 
Technology. 
Mitra-Kahn, B. (2005). General Equilibrium Theory, its History and its Relation (if any) to the 
Market Economy. London: City University London. 
Modigliani, F., & Miller, M. (1958). The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance, and the Theory of 
Investment. The American Economic Review, 261-297. 
Myers, S., & Majluf, N. (1984). Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms Have 
Information That Investors Do Not Have. Journal of Financial Economics, 187-221. 
National Treasury. (2008, June 12). Budget Speech for the Fiscal Year 2008/2009. Nairobi, Nairobi, 
Kenya: National Treasury. 
National Treasury. (2015, June 11). Budget Statement for the Fiscal Year 2015/2016. Nairobi, 
Nairobi, Kenya: National Treasury. 
Nekatibeb, H. (2012). Market Power of Ethiopian Banks_Evidence and Explanations. Addis Ababa: 
Addis Ababa University . 
Nguyen, D., Thanh, H., & Nguyen, H. (2018). What Determines the Profitability of Vietnam 
Commerial Banks? International Business Research, 231-245. 
57 
 
Park, H. M. (2009). Comparing Group Means: T-teasts and One-way ANOVA Using STATA, SAS, R 
and SPSS. Indiana: The University Information Technology Services (UITS) Centre for 
Statistical and Mathematical Computing. 
Qin, X., & Pastory, D. (2012). Commercial Banks Profitability Position: The Case of Tanzania. 
International Journal of Business and Management, 136-144. 
Republic of Kenya. (2007). Kenya Vision 2030. Nairobi: Government Printer. 
Republic of Kenya. (2013). Kenya Vision 2030: Second Medium Term Plan (2013-2017). Nairobi: 
Government Printer. 
Republic of Kenya. (2015). The Banking Act Chapter 488. Nairobi: Central Bank of Kenya. 
Sanya, S., & Gaertner, M. (2012). Assessing Bank Competition within the East African Community. 
Nairobi: IMF. 
Saunders, M., Lewis, P., & Thornhill, A. (2012). Research Methods for Business Students. Essex: 
Pearson. 
Simpasa, A. (2010). Characterising market power and its determinants in the Zambian banking 
indudstry. 
Tabak, B. M., Gomes, G. M., & Junior, M. M. (2012). The Impact of Market Power at Bank Level in 
Risk Taking: The Brazilian Case. Brasilia: Banco Central do Brasil. 
Tan, A., & Floros, C. (2012). Bank Profitability and GDP Growth in China: A Note. Journal of 
Chinese Eonomics and Business Studies, 267-273. 
58 
 
Were, M., & Wambua, J. (2013). Assessing the Determinants of Interest Rate Spread of Commercial 
Banks in Kenya: An Empirical Investigation. Nairobi: Kenya Bankers Association Centre for 



























% of the 
Market
Large Peer Group
Kenya Commercial Bank Ltd 504,778 13.70% 1 80,990 13.70% 58,067 11.92% 3 4,681 8.17%
Equity Bank Ltd 379,749 10.30% 2 52,341 8.80% N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Co-operative Bank of Kenya Ltd 349,998 9.50% 3 60,046 10.10% 32,518 6.68% 5 2,130 3.72%
Barclays Bank of Kenya Ltd 259,498 7.00% 4 42,095 7.10% 97,001 19.92% 1 11,022 19.24%
Standard Chartered Bank (K) Ltd 250,274 6.80% 5 43,905 7.40% 64,241 13.19% 2 6,368 11.12%
Diamond Trust Bank (K) Ltd 244,124 6.60% 6 36,432 6.10% 8,571 1.76% 12 1,175 2.05%
Commercial Bank of Africa Ltd 210,878 5.70% 7 27,470 4.60% 18,341 3.77% 7 1,648 2.88%
CfC Stanbic Bank (K) Ltd 
(1)
204,895 5.50% 8 30,238 5.10% 13,811 2.84% 8 1,601 2.79%
Stanbic Bank Kenya Limited 
(1)
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 9,974 2.05% 11 945 1.65%
Sub-Total 2,404,194 65.10% 62.90%
Medium Peer Group
NIC Bank Ltd 161,847 4.40% 9 30,288 5.10% 11,142 2.29% 10 2,576 4.50%
I&M Bank Ltd 164,116 4.40% 10 26,187 4.40% 12,130 2.49% 9 1,596 2.79%
National Bank of Kenya Ltd 115,114 3.10% 11 10,996 1.90% 25,977 5.33% 6 2,154 3.76%
Citibank N.A. Kenya 103,324 2.80% 12 19,629 3.30% 33,769 6.93% 4 4,172 7.28%
Bank of Baroda (K) Ltd 82,907 2.20% 13 14,225 2.40% 8,044 1.65% 13 823 1.44%
Family Bank Ltd. 69,432 1.90% 14 12,619 2.10% N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Housing Finance Ltd 68,085 1.80% 15 9,775 1.60% N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Prime Bank Ltd 65,338 1.80% 16 10,834 1.80% 5,232 1.07% 17 604 1.05%
Bank of Africa (K) Ltd 
(2)
55,996 1.50% 17 8,418 1.40% N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Bank of India 47,815 1.30% 18 9,536 1.60% 5,829 1.20% 15 885 1.54%
Ecobank Kenya Ltd 
(3)
47,124 1.30% 19 7,307 1.20% N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Sub-Total 981,099 26.50% 159,814 26.80%
Small Peer Group
Guaranty Trust Bank Ltd 
(4)
29,619 0.80% 20 8,366 1.40% N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Gulf African Bank Ltd 27,156 0.70% 21 4,376 0.70% N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
African Banking Corporation Ltd 22,422 0.60% 22 2,997 0.50% 3,833 0.79% 24 426 0.74%
Victoria Commercial Bank Ltd 22,403 0.60% 23 5,060 0.90% 3,336 0.68% 27 492 0.86%
Sidian Bank Ltd
 (5)
20,876 0.60% 24 3,869 0.70% 2,174 0.45% 34 689 1.20%
Habib Bank A.G. Zurich 17,033 0.50% 25 2,965 0.50% 4,030 0.83% 23 409 0.71%
Development Bank of Kenya Ltd 16,418 0.40% 26 2,903 0.50% 2,693 0.55% 30 901 1.57%
Giro Commercial Bank Ltd 16,254 0.40% 27 3,077 0.50% 4,257 0.87% 20 420 0.73%
Jamii Bora Bank Ltd 
(6)
15,724 0.40% 28 3,590 0.60% N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
First Community Bank Ltd 14,962 0.40% 29 1,557 0.30% N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Guardian Bank Ltd 14,705 0.40% 30 2,215 0.40% 4,066 0.83% 22 681 1.19%
Consolidated Bank of Kenya Ltd 13,918 0.40% 31 1,403 0.20% 2,442 0.50% 32 636 1.11%
Spire Bank Ltd 
(7)
13,803 0.40% 32 1,817 0.30% 2,941 0.60% 29 460 0.80%
Habib Bank Ltd 12,508 0.30% 33 2,454 0.40% 3,569 0.73% 25 406 0.71%
Credit Bank Ltd 12,202 0.30% 34 2,460 0.40% 2,145 0.44% 35 404 0.71%
Trans - National Bank Ltd 10,465 0.30% 35 2,073 0.30% 1,439 0.30% 38 867 1.51%
M Oriental Commercial Bank Ltd 
(8)
9,920 0.30% 36 2,931 0.50% 2,211 0.45% 33 650 1.13%
Paramount Universal Bank Ltd 9,427 0.30% 37 1,644 0.30% 1,209 0.25% 40 284 0.50%
UBA Kenya Ltd 5,601 0.20% 38 2,143 0.40% N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Middle East Bank (K) Ltd 5,234 0.10% 39 1,192 0.20% 3,455 0.71% 26 711 1.24%
Sub-Total 310,651 8.40% 59,094 10.00%
























% of the 
Market
Banks existing in 2003 and no longer in 2016
First American Bank Limited
 (9)
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 6,660 1.37% 14 1,243 2.17%
Fina Bank Limited
 (4)
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 5,851 1.20% 16 629 1.10%
Credit Agricole Indosuez 
(2)
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 4,809 0.99% 19 740 1.29%
Akiba Bank Ltd
 (3)
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 4,176 0.86% 21 689 1.20%
Southern Credit Banking Corp
 (7)
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 3,264 0.67% 28 463 0.81%
Charterhouse Bank Ltd 
(10)
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 2,632 0.54% 31 475 0.83%
Industrial Development Bank N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 1,486 0.31% 37 274 0.48%
City Finance Bank
 (6)
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 650 0.13% 42 406 0.71%
Daima Bank Limited 
(11)
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 404 0.08% 43 -274 -0.48%
Dubai Bank Limited 
(12)
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 783 0.16% 41 355 0.62%
Imperial Bank Limited 
(13)
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 4,921 1.01% 18 742 1.30%
Chase Bank Limited 
(14)
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 1,710 0.35% 36 471 0.82%
Fidelity Commercial Bank Ltd 
(15)
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 1,235 0.25% 39 260 0.45%
Source: Source: CBK 2003 and 2016 Annual Banking Supervision Reports
Notes:
(1) CFC and Stanbic Banks merged in 2008
(2) Bank of Africa acquired Credit Agricole Indosuez in 2004
(3) Akiba bank converted to EABS in 2004 which was later acquired by Ecobank in 2008
(4) Guaranty Trust Bank acquired Fina Bank in 2013
(5) Formely known as K-REP Bank
(6) Jamii Bora and City Finance Bank merged in 2010
(7) Southern Credit Banking Corp was acquired by Equatorial Commercial Bank in 2010 and rebranded to Spire Bank in 2016
(8) Previously known as Delphis Bank up till 2003
(9) First American Bank was acquired by Commercial Bank of Africa in 2005
(10) Under statutory management
(11) liquidated in 2005
(12) Under liquidation
(13) Imperial Bank Limited
(14) Chase Bank Limited




Appendix B: List of Commercial Banks as at 31st December 2016 
Large Peer Group Small Peer Group 
1 Kenya Commercial Bank Ltd  20 Guaranty Trust Bank Ltd 
2 Equity Bank Ltd 21 Gulf African Bank Ltd 
3 Co-operative Bank of Kenya Ltd 22 African Banking Corporation Ltd  
4 Barclays Bank of Kenya Ltd 23 Victoria Commercial Bank Ltd 
5 Standard Chartered Bank (K) Ltd 24 Sidian Bank Ltd 
6 Diamond Trust Bank (K) Ltd 25 Habib Bank A.G. Zurich 
7 Commercial Bank of Africa Ltd 26 Development Bank of Kenya Ltd 
8 CfC Stanbic Bank (K) Ltd 27 Giro Commercial Bank Ltd 
  
 
28 Jamii Bora Bank Ltd 
Medium Peer Group 29 First Community Bank Ltd  
9 NIC Bank Ltd 30 Guardian Bank Ltd 
10 I&M Bank Ltd  31 Consolidated Bank of Kenya Ltd 
11 National Bank of Kenya Ltd 32 Spire Bank Ltd 
12 Citibank N.A. Kenya 33 Habib Bank Ltd  
13 Bank of Baroda (K) Ltd 34 Credit Bank Ltd 
14 Family Bank Ltd. 35 Trans - National Bank Ltd  
15 Housing Finance Ltd 36 M Oriental Commercial Bank Ltd 
16 Prime Bank Ltd  37 Paramount Universal Bank Ltd 
17 Bank of Africa (K) Ltd 38 UBA Kenya Ltd 
18 Bank of India 39 Middle East Bank (K) Ltd 
19 Ecobank Kenya Ltd     








Appendix C: Standard Multiple Linear Regression Coefficients 
Coefficients Peer Group One Pre-Regulation-HHI – Bank Indicators 
SUMMARY OUTPUT 
Regression Statistics 
Multiple R 0.876 
R Square 0.768 
Adjusted R Square 0.419 
Standard Error 82.511 
Observations 6 
 












Intercept 1305.51 302.33 4.32 0.05 4.70 2606.33 4.70 2606.33 
Core capital-Pre 0.00 0.04 0.00 1.00 -0.17 0.17 -0.17 0.17 
Total deposits-Pre -0.01 0.01 -1.07 0.40 -0.07 0.04 -0.07 0.04 
Profit before tax-Pre 0.05 0.10 0.50 0.66 -0.39 0.50 -0.39 0.50 
Coefficients Peer Group One Pre-Regulation-HHI – Macroeconomic Indicators 
SUMMARY OUTPUT 
Regression Statistics 
Multiple R 0.513 
R Square 0.263 
Adjusted R Square -0.228 
Standard Error 119.978 
Observations 6.000 
 












Intercept 545.38 252.66 2.16 0.12 -258.70 1349.46 -258.70 1349.46 
GDP-Pre 14.60 32.06 0.46 0.68 -87.44 116.64 -87.44 116.64 
Inflation-Pre 11.86 11.72 1.01 0.39 -25.43 49.16 -25.43 49.16 
Coefficients Peer Group One Pre-Regulation-ROE – Banking Indicators 
SUMMARY OUTPUT 
Regression Statistics 
Multiple R 0.874433917 
R Square 0.764634675 
Adjusted R Square 0.411586688 

















Intercept 21.57 11.12 1.94 0.19 -26.27 69.40 -26.27 69.40 
Core capital-Pre 0.002606 0.00 1.79 0.22 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 
Total deposits-Pre -0.000157 0.00 -0.31 0.79 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Profit before tax-Pre 0.000417 0.00 0.11 0.92 -0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.02 
Coefficients Peer Group One Pre-Regulation-ROE – Macroeconomic Indicators 
SUMMARY OUTPUT 
Regression Statistics 
Multiple R 0.682 
R Square 0.465 
Adjusted R Square 0.108 
Standard Error 3.735 
Observations 6.000 
 
  Coefficients Standard 
Error 








Intercept 33.86 7.87 4.31 0.02 8.83 58.90 8.83 58.90 
GDP-Pre 0.23 1.00 0.23 0.83 -2.94 3.41 -2.94 3.41 
Inflation-Pre -0.41 0.36 -1.11 0.35 -1.57 0.76 -1.57 0.76 
Coefficients Peer Group One Post-Regulation-HHI Banking Indicators 
SUMMARY OUTPUT 
Regression Statistics 
Multiple R 0.654 
R Square 0.428 
Adjusted R Square -0.001 
Standard Error 37.210 
Observations 8.000 
 
  Coefficients Standard 
Error 








Intercept 573.06 48.03 11.931 0.0003 439.706 706.409 439.7055 706.408 
Core capital-Post -0.01 0.009 -1.491 0.210 -0.038 0.0116 -0.0384 0.0116 
Total deposits-Post 0.003 0.002 1.389 0.237 -0.003 0.0075 -0.0025 0.0075 








Coefficients Peer Group One Post-Regulation-HHI Macroeconomic Indicators 
SUMMARY OUTPUT 
Regression Statistics 
Multiple R 0.08809892 
R Square 0.00776142 
Adjusted R Square -0.38913401 
Standard Error 43.8383021 
Observations 8 
 














Intercept 555.94 62.56 8.89 0.00 395.11 716.76 395.11 716.76 
GDP-Post -0.05 10.52 0.00 1.00 -27.09 27.00 -27.09 27.00 
Inflation-Post 0.67 3.43 0.20 0.85 -8.15 9.49 -8.15 9.49 
Coefficients Peer Group One Post-Regulation-ROE Banking Indicators 
SUMMARY OUTPUT 
Regression Statistics 
Multiple R 0.63889666 
R Square 0.40818894 
Adjusted R Square -0.03566935 
Standard Error 1.95883527 
Observations 8 
 
  Coefficients Standard 
Error 








Intercept 31.752427 2.53 12.56 0.00 24.73 38.77 24.73 38.77 
Core capital-Post -0.000075 0.00 -0.16 0.88 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Total deposits-Post -0.000003 0.00 -0.04 0.97 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Profit before tax-Post 0.000194 0.00 1.58 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Coefficients Peer Group One Post-Regulation-ROE Macroeconomic Indicators 
SUMMARY OUTPUT 
Regression Statistics 
Multiple R 0.340 
R Square 0.115 
Adjusted R Square -0.238 


















Intercept 29.36 3.06 9.60 0.00 21.50 37.22 21.50 37.22 
GDP-Post 0.30 0.51 0.58 0.59 -1.02 1.62 -1.02 1.62 
Inflation-Post 0.08 0.17 0.47 0.66 -0.35 0.51 -0.35 0.51 
Coefficients Peer Group Two Pre-Regulation-HHI Banking Indicators 
Regression Statistics 
Multiple R 0.665 
R Square 0.442 
Adjusted R Square -0.395 
Standard Error 12.516 
Observations 6.000 
 
  Coefficients Standard 
Error 








Intercept 128.66 74.99 1.72 0.23 -194.02 451.33 -194.02 451.33 
Core capital-Pre 0.02 0.01 1.04 0.41 -0.05 0.08 -0.05 0.08 
Total deposits-Pre -0.01 0.01 -0.98 0.43 -0.05 0.03 -0.05 0.03 
Profit before tax-Pre 0.06 0.09 0.71 0.55 -0.32 0.44 -0.32 0.44 
Coefficients Peer Group Two Pre-Regulation-HHI Macroeconomic Indicators 
Regression Statistics 
Multiple R 0.938 
R Square 0.880 
Adjusted R Square 0.799 
Standard Error 4.747 
Observations 6.000 
 
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0% 
Intercept 105.54 10.00 10.56 0.00 73.73 137.36 73.73 137.36 
GDP-Pre -2.59 1.27 -2.04 0.13 -6.63 1.45 -6.63 1.45 
Inflation-Pre -2.12 0.46 -4.57 0.02 -3.60 -0.64 -3.60 -0.64 
Coefficients Peer Group Two Pre-Regulation-ROE Banking Indicators 
Regression Statistics 
Multiple R 0.965 
R Square 0.931 
Adjusted R Square 0.828 




















Intercept 11.314 10.061 1.125 0.378 -31.975 54.604 -31.975 54.604 
Core capital-Pre 0.003 0.002 1.295 0.325 -0.006 0.011 -0.006 0.011 
Total deposits-Pre 0.000 0.001 -0.122 0.914 -0.005 0.005 -0.005 0.005 
Profit before tax-Pre 0.011 0.012 0.940 0.447 -0.040 0.062 -0.040 0.062 
Coefficients Peer Group Two Pre-Regulation-ROE Macroeconomic Indicators 
Regression Statistics 
Multiple R 0.276 
R Square 0.076 
Adjusted R Square -0.539 
Standard Error 5.020 
Observations 6 
 
  Coefficients Standard 
Error 








Intercept 24.32 10.57 2.30 0.10 -9.33 57.96 -9.33 57.96 
GDP-Pre -0.11 1.34 -0.08 0.94 -4.38 4.16 -4.38 4.16 
Inflation-Pre -0.21 0.49 -0.44 0.69 -1.77 1.35 -1.77 1.35 
Coefficients Peer Group Two Post-Regulation-HHI Banking Indicators 
Regression Statistics 
Multiple R 0.902 
R Square 0.814 
Adjusted R Square 0.675 

















Intercept 58.94 4.43 13.31 0.00 46.64 71.24 46.64 71.24 
Core capital-Pre 0.00 0.00 -1.70 0.16 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 
Total deposits-Pre 0.00 0.00 2.23 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 







Coefficients Peer Group Two Post-Regulation-HHI Macroeconomic Indicators 
SUMMARY OUTPUT 
Regression Statistics 
Multiple R 0.523 
R Square 0.273 
Adjusted R Square -0.017 
Standard Error 5.624 
Observations 8 
 
  Coefficients Standard 
Error 






Intercept 62.40 8.03 7.78 0.00 41.77 83.03 41.77 83.03 
GDP-Post 1.81 1.35 1.34 0.24 -1.66 5.27 -1.66 5.27 
Inflation-Post 0.05 0.44 0.11 0.92 -1.08 1.18 -1.08 1.18 
Coefficients Peer Group Two Post-Regulation-ROE Banking Indicators 
Regression Statistics 
Multiple R 0.750 
R Square 0.563 
Adjusted R Square 0.234 
Standard Error 3.974 
Observations 8.000 
 
  Coefficients Standard 
Error 








Intercept 25.206 5.541 4.549 0.010 9.820 40.591 9.820 40.591 
Core capital-Post -0.002 0.003 -0.807 0.465 -0.010 0.005 -0.010 0.005 
Total deposits-Post 0.000 0.001 0.158 0.882 -0.002 0.002 -0.002 0.002 
Profit before tax-Post 0.004 0.006 0.600 0.581 -0.014 0.022 -0.014 0.022 
Coefficients Peer Group Two Post-Regulation-ROE Macroeconomic Indicators 
SUMMARY OUTPUT 
Regression Statistics 
Multiple R 0.472 
R Square 0.223 
Adjusted R Square -0.088 







  Coefficients Standard 
Error 








Intercept 15.36 6.76 2.27 0.07 -2.03 32.74 -2.03 32.74 
GDP-Post 0.08 1.14 0.07 0.95 -2.84 3.01 -2.84 3.01 
Inflation-Post 0.43 0.37 1.17 0.29 -0.52 1.39 -0.52 1.39 
Coefficients Peer Group Three Pre-Regulation-HHI Banking Indicators 
Regression Statistics 
Multiple R 0.757 
R Square 0.573 
Adjusted R Square -0.069 
Standard Error 2.044 
Observations 6 
 
  Coefficients Standard 
Error 








Intercept 12.34 6.71 1.84 0.21 -16.55 41.23 -16.55 41.23 
Core capital-Pre 0.03 0.03 0.93 0.45 -0.10 0.15 -0.10 0.15 
Total deposits-Pre -0.01 0.01 -1.24 0.34 -0.05 0.03 -0.05 0.03 
Profit before tax-Pre 0.01 0.03 0.23 0.84 -0.14 0.16 -0.14 0.16 
Coefficients Peer Group Three Pre-Regulation-HHI Macroeconomic Indicators 
Regression Statistics 
Multiple R 0.661 
R Square 0.437 
Adjusted R Square 0.062 
Standard Error 1.915 
Observations 6 
 
  Coefficients Standard 
Error 








Intercept 2.285 4.033 0.566 0.611 -10.550 15.120 -10.550 15.120 
GDP-Pre -0.220 0.512 -0.430 0.696 -1.849 1.409 -1.849 1.409 
Inflation-Pre 0.165 0.187 0.884 0.442 -0.430 0.761 -0.430 0.761 
Coefficients Peer Group Three Pre-Regulation-ROE Banking Indicators 
SUMMARY OUTPUT 
Regression Statistics 
Multiple R 0.859126 
R Square 0.738097 
Adjusted R Square 0.345243 





  Coefficients Standard 
Error 








Intercept 4.463 9.164 0.487 0.674 -34.966 43.892 -34.966 43.892 
Core capital-Pre -0.012 0.040 -0.292 0.798 -0.184 0.161 -0.184 0.161 
Total deposits-Pre 0.003 0.011 0.249 0.826 -0.046 0.052 -0.046 0.052 
Profit before tax-Pre 0.083 0.047 1.768 0.219 -0.119 0.286 -0.119 0.286 
Coefficients Peer Group Three Pre-Regulation-ROE Macroeconomic Indicators 
Regression Statistics 
Multiple R 0.773 
R Square 0.597 
Adjusted R Square 0.328 
Standard Error 2.826 
Observations 6.000 
 
  Coefficients Standard 
Error 








Intercept 9.86 5.95 1.66 0.20 -9.08 28.80 -9.08 28.80 
GDP-Pre 0.71 0.76 0.94 0.42 -1.70 3.11 -1.70 3.11 
Inflation-Pre -0.25 0.28 -0.90 0.43 -1.13 0.63 -1.13 0.63 
Coefficients Peer Group Three Post-Regulation-HHI Banking Indicators 
Regression Statistics 
Multiple R 0.983 
R Square 0.966 
Adjusted R Square 0.941 
Standard Error 0.160 
Observations 8.000 
 
  Coefficients Standard 
Error 








Intercept 1.95 0.24 8.07 0.00 1.28 2.62 1.28 2.62 
Core capital-Post 0.00 0.00 1.16 0.31 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Total deposits-Post 0.00 0.00 0.44 0.68 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Profit before tax-Post 0.01 0.00 2.49 0.07 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 
Coefficients Peer Group Three Post-Regulation-HHI Macroeconomic Indicators 
Regression Statistics 
Multiple R 0.269 
R Square 0.072 
Adjusted R Square -0.299 





  Coefficients Standard 
Error 








Intercept 3.711 1.066 3.480 0.018 0.970 6.452 0.970 6.452 
GDP-Post 0.098 0.179 0.545 0.609 -0.363 0.559 -0.363 0.559 
Inflation-Post -0.022 0.058 -0.381 0.719 -0.173 0.128 -0.173 0.128 
Coefficients Peer Group Three Post-Regulation-ROE Banking Indicators 
Regression Statistics 
Multiple R 0.98084 
R Square 0.96204 
Adjusted R Square 0.93357 
Standard Error 0.93418 
Observations 8.000 
 
  Coefficients Standard 
Error 








Intercept 10.757 1.413 7.612 0.002 6.833 14.681 6.833 14.681 
Core capital-Post 0.003 0.002 1.395 0.235 -0.003 0.010 -0.003 0.010 
Total deposits-Post -0.003 0.001 -4.377 0.012 -0.005 -0.001 -0.005 -0.001 
Profit before tax-Post 0.081 0.014 6.009 0.004 0.044 0.119 0.044 0.119 
Coefficients Peer Group Three Post-Regulation-ROE Macroeconomic Indicators 
Regression Statistics 
Multiple R 0.488 
R Square 0.238 
Adjusted R Square -0.066 
Standard Error 3.743 
Observations 8.000 
 
  Coefficients Standard 
Error 








Intercept 3.06 5.34 0.57 0.59 -10.67 16.79 -10.67 16.79 
GDP-Post 0.73 0.90 0.81 0.46 -1.58 3.04 -1.58 3.04 
Inflation-Post 0.24 0.29 0.83 0.45 -0.51 1.00 -0.51 1.00 
 
